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THINGS ARE DIFFERENT WHEN YOU 
OPEN UP: ECONOMIC OPENNESS, 
DOMESTIC ECONOMY, AND INCOME 
 
 
Edsel L. Beja, Jr. 
Abstract 
“Does economic openness increase income?” is retested using quantity measures 
of trade, finance, and domestic economic size, and the short answer is: “It de-
pends”. The results show that Africa and the Americas lose from both trade and 
financial openness, while Asia gains from trade openness but loses from financial 
openness. The industrialized region benefits from both trade and financial open-
ness. In all regions, the domestic base compensates for any adverse effects of 
economic openness. The overall experience of economies with openness can be 
enhanced with healthier external and domestic engagements. The case study on 
the Philippines finds that the country gains from trade and financial openness but 
not from the domestic base. In this case, economic progress is difficult because 
the gains from external engagement are wiped out by the losses from domestic 
economy disengagement.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Trade and financial flows have dominated economic debates since the 1970s. It is argued, 
for instance, that the unrestricted and unprecedented growth of trade and finance validate the 
(re)emergence of economic globalization, which is a welcome development. In the orthodox 
view, resources are obtained from the world economy and, when applied in the domestic econo-
my, they enlarge productive possibilities, generate economic activities, and increase incomes. 
Economic objectives are realized in the process without socio-political struggles. The conclusion 
is that the relatively open economies have been able to achieve economic progress than the closed 
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ones. 
 There is a sizeable literature on the relationship between (some measures of) trade open-
ness and economic progress, with Dollar (1992), Sachs & Warner (1995), Edwards (1998), Fran-
kel & Romer (1999), and Wacziarg & Welch (2003) as notable examples. There is no need to go 
into a detailed discussion of the literature, except to point out that these studies find a positive 
correlation between trade openness and higher income. There are many reasons for this correla-
tion. For instance, access to a large external market is crucial for economic progress as it induces 
scale economies, efficiency through specialization, etc. There are indirect benefits from trade 
openness, too. Increased investment and technology flows, diversification of the production struc-
ture, among others, help sustain economic expansion to generate a cumulative process of ad-
vancement toward economic prosperity. 
Levine & Renelt (1992), Harrison (1996), Pritchett (1996), Rodriguez & Rodrik (1999), 
Wacziarg & Welch (2003), and Rodriguez (2007), for example, have challenged the above view. 
These authors point out some methodological problems in above studies but, if the issues are 
sorted out, the purported positive relationship is not confirmed or, in some studies, the empirics 
give opposite results. Moreover, Rodrik et al. (2002), Dollar & Kraay (2003), Chang et al. (2005), 
and Rigobon & Rodrik (2005) have found that institutions are important for successful trade 
openness. Trade flows (in themselves) play little, if any, role in raising incomes. Rather, the bene-
fits of trade openness are contingent to the level of economic progress. In short, the complemen-
tary factors that support trade openness play important roles in transforming potential gains into 
actual increases in income.  
And there is a comparably sizeable literature on the relationship between (some measure 
of) financial openness and economic progress like King & Levine (1993), Quinn (1997), Edwards 
(2001), Beck et al. (2000), Edison et al. (2002), and Prasad et al. (2007). Where capital is limited 
and investments difficult, financial openness is a route to overcome such problems. Financial re-
pression or similar restrictive arrangements makes funds unnecessarily expensive and misallo-
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cated. In the end, they constrain economic activities. As with trade, there are also indirect benefits 
from financial openness, of which the introduction of (some sort of) disciplining mechanism that 
reward the adoption of more sensible economic policies, the enhancement of domestic competi-
tion that improve resource allocation, and the diversification of domestic production that induce 
industrial deepening are the most important. As the economy matures, it is able to mobilize more 
funds to support greater economic expansion. As the economy builds up capacity, it is also able to 
deploy funds more effectively. Robust economic performance is accomplished in a circular 
process of continuous expansion. For such reasons, financial openness is an important step to 
have economic progress. 
Griffin & Enos (1970) and Kaminsky & Reinhart (1999) find that financial openness re-
sults in the contrary, if not perverse, outcomes. Rather than financial inflows, what have hap-
pened are outflows. There have been financial instabilities that resulted in economic crises. Ro-
drik (1998), Prasad et al. (2003), and Kose et al. (2007) point out that, if the methodological prob-
lems are addressed, the empirics validate a positive relationship between financial openness and 
income, albeit the figures are too small to support strong arguments about financial openness. 
Moreover, Henry (2007) and Rodriguez (2007) argue that the purported relationship is often re-
jected because the empirics are unable to capture the small, even temporary, gains from financial 
openness. Yet, Obstfeld (2008) does not find convincing evidence in support of (even a small) 
positive relationship.  
What appears to be supported by the empirics is that a positive relationship exists be-
tween financial openness and income once an economy reaches some threshold of institutional 
and organizational advancement (e.g., Prasad et al. 2003; Kose et al. 2007). It suggests that struc-
tural transformation and policies that result in stability, strengthen economic competitiveness, and 
enhance capacity governance are requirements for a positive experience with financial openness. 
So opening up is not a one-shot action. It is a serious process that requires real hard work and sus-
tained effort. Otherwise, short-term benefits from financial openness are reversed with medium- 
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or long-term problems.  
There is, of course, an earlier literature on the importance of the domestic economy and 
its development for the realization of economic progress (e.g., Myrdal 1957; Hirschman 1958; 
Gerschenkron 1962; Rosenstein-Rodan 1961; List 1966; Kaldor 1967; Chenery et al. 1986). The 
notion that a solid domestic base – that is to say, a robust productive structure, adequate infra-
structure, effective institutional and organizational systems, proficient human capital, etc. – is 
fundamental for economic progress was established then. Johnson (1982), Gold (1986), Amsden 
(1989), Haggard (1990), Wade (1990), Evans (1995), Weiss & Hobson (1995), Chang (1996; 
2002), Lall (1996), and Reinert (2007) have re-highlighted the importance of ensuring the integri-
ty of the domestic base before and during economic opening in order to realize and sustain eco-
nomic progress. 
This paper retests the question “does economic openness increase income?” The cover-
age is trade and financial flows and domestic economic size to minimize the possibility that em-
pirics is driven by an excluded dimension. For completeness, regional and temporal dimensions 
are also included to capture the spatial and secular characteristics of openness and domestic size. 
Details of the methodology are explained in the next section. Then the results are discussed; first, 
the cross-country study first then the Philippines case study. The first set of results is useful to see 
the general tendencies but it is not as useful to appreciate a country’s experience. A case study 
allows for a deeper exploration of the results but limited for broader analysis. By juxtaposing the 
two results, deeper analysis can be had. The last section concludes the discussion. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 The methodology takes off from Frankel & Romer (1999) and Kose et al. (2007). In this 
paper, “economic openness” means external engagement that has an effect on income.1 Domestic 
                                                 
1 The entry point is actual flow of trade and finance. If the entry point is policy, the appropriate measures to 
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economic conditions are important; they, too, affect income. Obviously, trade and financial open-
ness interact with domestic conditions to produce further effects income.  
 The external and domestic conditions plus their interactions are modeled as follows: Y =  
evuTRZXXΩTRZΘTRXΦTRXΦ
m n
nmKT
m n
nm
m n
nmKK
m n
nmTT +++⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅ ∑∑∑∑∑∑∑∑ , where Y 
is average income; XT and XK are trade and financial flows, respectively; Z is domestic economic 
size; R is regional dummy; T is decadal dummy; u and v are fixed effects; and e is the residual. 
Average income is gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, which is a “direct” measure of eco-
nomic welfare.  
 Income distribution is excluded in the model to have a manageable specification. Need-
less to say, the results are interpreted as best case scenarios if income inequality is considerable. 
  Actual trade openness is operationalized as the share of gross trade (i.e., exports plus im-
ports) to GDP and the share of net trade (i.e., exports minus imports) to GDP. The former cap-
tures the overall effect of openness, while the latter is for the directional effect. 
 Actual financial openness is operationalized as the share of gross capital flows (i.e., as-
sets plus liabilities) to GDP and the share net capital flows (i.e., assets minus liabilities) to GDP. 
As with trade, the former captures the overall effect of openness, while the latter is for the direc-
tional effect. 
 The gross flows may mean positive (negative) effects on income, but net flows may have 
non-trivial negative (positive) effects on income. Most analyses ignore this dimension. There is 
thus the possibility that results have overestimated (underestimated) the impact of openness. The 
above setup controls for the contradictory effects generated by gross and net flows. The strategy 
is to use the net flows results as adjustments on the gross flows results.  
Domestic economic size is operationalized as the ratio of population to total land area. 
                                                                                                                                                 
use are policy-based indicators like tariff rates and capital controls. How authorities participate in the econ-
omy to shape economic outcomes is not covered in the paper for practical reasons. 
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There are other measures but not enough data are available for large cross-country empirics. The 
rationale of the setup takes of from home-bias effect argued by Tinbergen (1962) and McCallum 
(1995). That is, the big economies are typically “distant” from the external economy with regards 
to trade (compared to small economies). Transactions are relatively secure within their borders 
and the large domestic market is like a “captured” market for the domestic producers. Small 
economies have to engage the external economy to make domestic production and industrializa-
tion viable. With regards to finance, “distance” may be less obvious given the advances in tech-
nology and computing. Still, domestic size is an important factor in, say, investment decisions. 
Feldstein & Horioka (1980) and French & Poterba (1991) found that the big economies are typi-
cally “distant” from the external economy. 
Because of the gross and net specifications for openness, there are also two sets of results 
for domestic size. Taking off from Mundell (1957) and Markussen (1983), the results from the 
empirics with gross flows are used as the adjustments on the results from the empirics with the 
net flows. The setup controls for hazards like threat-effects due to race-to-the-bottom competi-
tion, production and/or capital pullout, or social safety nets or public support elimination that 
come with economic openness and undermine the domestic base. 
The fourth term model is the interaction term of XT, XK, and Z. It acknowledges the pos-
sibility that trade and financial flows complement in some way. How their interactions work out 
depends on specific domestic conditions. The strategy is to introduce the interaction term with the 
expectation that it has a positive effect on income. 
Region-related factors are captured by a dummy variable, R, covering Africa, Asia, 
Americas, and industrialized regions. R takes the value of one if the region is, say, Africa; zero 
otherwise. The setup controls for idiosyncratic region characteristics independent of economic 
openness, domestic economic size, and time. Thus it is known that many high performing devel-
oping economies are clustered in Asia, while many poor performing economies are clustered in 
Africa. It is also known that spillover effects from regional expansion pulls up other economies in 
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the region, say, in a “flying geese” fashion (e.g., Akamatsu 1961). Commonalities in infrastruc-
ture, institutions and organizations, human capital, etc., are also relevant (e.g., Acemoglu et al. 
2001). That is, R attempts to even out the specific economy variations to extract the regional 
trends. 
The period dummy, T, covers the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. T takes the value of one if the 
period is the 1980s; zero otherwise. The setup controls for idiosyncratic period characteristics 
independent of economic openness, domestic economic size, and region. It is known, for instance, 
that economies share expansions and contractions in, say, an economic synchronization fashion 
(see, e.g., Kose et al. 2003; Kose et al. 2008). T attempts to even out the specific economy varia-
tions to extract the secular trends.  
Lastly, there are cross-interaction terms, covering economic openness, domestic econom-
ic size, and region-period dummies. This setup indirectly controls for factors like infrastructure, 
institutions and organizations, human capital, etc.., which the indicators in the model do not 
measure directly. Obviously, the stages of development are relevant in that they affect the way 
the changing factors (i.e., economic openness and domestic economic size) interact with the un-
changing (i.e., region and time) or slow changing factors (i.e., infrastructure, institutions and or-
ganizations, and human capital). The strategy makes the results not useful for policy. However, 
they remain suggestive on how the variations in policies and/or conditions affect income (Frankel 
& Romer 1999).  
Once the empirics are sorted out, the last step is to calculate the income elasticities due to 
trade and financial openness as well as domestic economic size: 
Y
X
Φˆ
T
TTε ⋅= , 
Y
X
Φˆ
K
KKε ⋅= , and 
Y
ZˆZε ⋅Θ= , where TΦˆ , KΦˆ  and Θˆ  are the regression coefficients, and TX , KX , Z  and Y  are the 
standard means of indicators.2 The study covers the period 1980 to 2005. There are 71 economies 
                                                 
2 Regression results are heteroskedastic and autocorrelation covariance consistent.  
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in the dataset (see the list of countries at the end of the paper) distributed across Africa, Asia, 
Americas, and industrialized regions. The raw data are from the World Development Indicators 
(2007) and Lane & Milesi-Ferretti (2007). The regression was done using Eviews. 
 
THE CROSS-COUNTRY EXPERIENCE 
 
 Trade Openness and Income 
 Table 1 reveals that Africa’s gross income elasticities due to trade flow have declined 
between the 1980s and the 2000s. The figures adjusted for the trade balance indicate that Africa 
has not benefited from trade openness, especially since the 1990s. They show a shift in the way 
trade flows have affected income: from a positive effect in the 1980s to a negative one after-
wards. The recent figures suggest contractions in income despite increases in trade openness.3 
Therefore a positive relationship between trade openness and income is not defensible in Africa. 
 There is no question that African economies have been opened to trade. The problem, 
however, is not whether the region has embarked on opening up; rather, the nature of its external 
engagement has been problematic. For instance, Africa has remained in primary and low technol-
ogy goods production. Thus its trade does generate large income effects. Second, African trade 
has, on the whole, been directed to African economies instead to the world economy. They com-
pete with each other since they have similar goods and go to the same market. Moreover, African 
problems like inadequate infrastructure, limited institutional and organizational systems, poor 
human capital, unsteady macroeconomic and political conditions, and so on have limited, if not 
impeded, structural transformation. These problems have become severe especially since the 
1990s. Technology advancement and innovation have been limited as well, especially because of 
a premature shift to trade openness after colonial independence in the 1960s and 1970s. Thus in-
                                                 
3 10 units increase in trade openness implies 41units decrease in income (or 7.1 per cent of average income 
in the 2000s); at 15 units, 61.5 units decrease in income (or 10.7 per cent of average income in the 2000s). 
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dustrialization has not taken root in the region. The industrial base that existed at the time of their 
independence simply withered in the 1980s and, by the 1990s, clunked out. In short, Africa has 
not been able to evolve from the same production structure it had in the 1980s; consequently, it 
has not succeeded in capitalizing on trade. The condition today has become very serious, unfortu-
nately, that Africa would need significant support to revive its productive structure. In the mean 
time, trade contractions in the 2000s, together with the vicious domestic constraints, have gener-
ated economic stagnation in Africa. 
 The figures for Asia in Table 1 are strikingly different to those of the other developing 
regions. For Asia, gross income elasticities due to trade flows suggest encouraging results. The 
trend has been robust even with trade balance adjustments. Indeed, the figures corroborate the 
view that Asia has persistently experienced increase in income with trade openness.4 Thus, at 
least in Asia, a positive relationship between trade openness and income has been validated. 
 Asia demonstrates the effectiveness of trade openness for economic progress. Its ap-
proach to external engagement, despite the uneasiness with it because of economic setback in the 
1990s, has remained viable. This approach has been characterized by domestic protection of stra-
tegic industries to drive economic expansion, technology advancement, productivity increase, 
etc., with the goal of gaining greater trade shares in the world economy. In the process, its pro-
ductive structure has enjoyed scale economies and succeeded in competing with other regions. 
Even with the recent shifts in trade flows toward the Asian region, the region has remained stead-
fast with its external engagement backed by a strategic, even practical, approach to industrial 
deepening and trade complementarities. It is an approach that has put great importance on conti-
nuous innovation, technology advancement, and search of new markets thereby push the produc-
tive structure away from atrophy or rigidity due to complacency. Despite on-going changes at the 
global economy, Asia remains poised to enjoy the positive effects from trade openness. 
                                                 
4 10 units increase in trade openness implies 50 units increase in income (or 4.4 per cent of average income 
in the 2000s); at 15 units, 75 units increase in income (or 6.5 per cent of average income in the 2000s).  
 10
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
 The results for the Americas are interesting to some extent. First, as in the African expe-
rience, the Americas have experienced deteriorations in gross income elasticities due to trade 
flows. The figures have been poor throughout the period of the study; they are actually worse 
with the trade balance adjustments. The figures suggest that the region has, on balance, not gained 
at all from trade openness.5 In short, a positive relationship between trade openness and income 
has not been found in the Americas. 
 Perhaps during the 1980s, as the Americas moved away from import-substitution-
inspired strategies of the 1960s and 1970s to a more market-focused approach, there were some 
gains from trade. Over time, however, the economic adjustments were not sustained partly be-
cause of the crises in the 1980s and partly because the adjustments were simply shifts in orienta-
tion and not disposition. Still, trade has remained directed to the domestic consumer markets ra-
ther than to the world economy, an approach that characterized the strategies of the 1960s and 
1970s. There has been no real structural transformation like in the Asian experience. The external 
engagement has not been able to induce scale economies. Meanwhile, the market-focused ap-
proach has undermined the remaining productive structure and institutional capacity. The ensuing 
poor infrastructure, degraded institutions and organizations, and macroeconomic problems, etc., 
have in turn accentuated the economic weaknesses of the region. In the end, trade openness has 
provided avenues for large trade leakages instead of income injections that the Americas fail to 
achieve robust economic expansions despite greater trade openness. 
 The gross income elasticities due to trade flows of the industrialized region have been 
negative in the 1980s to the 2000s, albeit the magnitudes improved over time. The overall elastic-
ities after adjustments for the trade balance uncover neutral effects of trade openness. In short, it 
is not easy to confirm a positive relationship between trade openness and income in the industria-
                                                 
5 10 units increase in trade openness implies 8 units decrease in income (or 0.3 per cent of average income 
in the 2000s); at 15 units, 12 units decrease in income (or 0.5 per cent of average income in the 2000s). 
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lized region. 
 The industrialized region has traditional confronted a weak trade balance with the rest of 
the world economy. Increases in trade openness in turn have contributed to their trade imbal-
ances. However, on balance, the industrialized region has traded more within itself instead with 
the developing regions. This trade pattern has come up partly because the developing regions 
have not been able to absorb trade from the industrialized region and partly because trade within 
the latter has been complementary. Thus while greater trade within the region has produced ad-
verse effects on incomes elsewhere, it has actually enhanced economic activities within. Technol-
ogy leadership and innovation have secured their dominant position. Another explanation con-
cerns spillover effects that have come with greater trade. Expansion in the industrialized region 
has basically induced secondary effects in terms of enhanced domestic linkages, which have sus-
tained long-term factors for economic expansion like productivity growth and agglomeration. In 
other words, the industrialized region has benefited from trade openness but only through the in-
direct consequences of trade within the region, which still produces increases in income. 
 
 Financial Openness and Income 
 What is evident in Table 2 is that the developing regions have a common downward trend 
in gross income elasticities due to financial flows. After adjusting for the net external position, 
the figures suggest that the developing regions have been hurt by financial openness, as the trend 
reversals into the negative zone suggest.6 There is therefore evidence to challenge the view of a 
                                                 
6 In Africa, 10 units increase in financial openness implies 82 units decrease in income (or 14.2 per cent of 
average income in the 2000s); at 15 units, 123 units decrease in income (or 21.3 per cent of average income 
in 2000). In Asia, 10 units increase in financial openness implies 67 units decrease in income (or 5.8 per 
cent of average income in the 2000s); at 15 units, 100.5 units decrease in income (or 8.8 per cent of average 
income in the 2000s). In the Americas, 10 units increase in financial openness implies 17 units decrease in 
income (or 0.6 per cent of average income in the 2000s); at 15 units, 25.5 units decrease in income (or 0.9 
per cent of average income in the 2000s). 
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positive relationship between financial openness and income.  
 The commonality of experience among the developing regions point to a requisite for 
successful financial openness: real industrialization and robust economic expansion. The figures 
for Africa and Asia during the 1980s suggest that an effective application of finance was not hin-
dered by limited financial openness. But limited structural transformations and poor macroeco-
nomic conditions because of weak institutions, infrastructure and organizations, human capital, 
etc., help explain why Africa and the Americas were unable to take advantage of finance in the 
1990s and 2000s. In Africa, the abject domestic conditions repelled finance, including those that 
were generated within the region. In the end, Africa was burdened by the costs of finance. In the 
Americas, financial flows were unable to support economic adjustment introduced in the 1980s. 
In the end, the region did not have the capacity to absorb finance. As these regions de-
industrialized, finance was frustrated from supporting economic activities. Of course, the debt 
crises of the 1980s and the 1990s have had far-reaching consequences on their productive struc-
tures. In short, the economic troubles throughout the 1980s to the 2000s explain why financial 
openness has not contributed to economic progress.  
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
 But Asia is interesting. Table 2 suggests that initially region was able to utilize finance to 
support economic activities but has now found it increasingly difficult to sustain that ability. De-
regulation and financial liberalization programs have accelerated in the 1990s, which explains 
why financial openness has reduced income. The robust economic expansion in the 1980s and in 
most of the 1990s was thus the result of a sound capacity to channel finance to support the pro-
ductive structure. By the 2000s, however, Asia was already constrained from deploying finance, 
first, because its capacity to do so was weakened with deregulation and financial liberalization 
and, second, deeper industrialization cannot be had because of the change in the nature of finance. 
Indeed, the figures suggest that financial openness has led to a serious erosion of income in the 
region. 
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 Financial openness in the developing regions has encouraged more of liabilities-creating 
finance instead of wealth-creating finance. With deregulation and liberalization entrenched, the 
developing regions have been unable to direct the flows into long-term and productive economic 
activities because short-term and speculative exposures are preferred. Whenever interventions are 
contemplated to change the direction of the economy, threats of financial pullout have been effec-
tive to upset the authorities. The expansion of liabilities, in turn, has undermined financial depth, 
which has enlarged risks for defaults, thereby enhancing the threats of financial pullout. Mean-
while, the capacity to absorb finance has reduced because the productive structure has deteri-
orated. It thus becomes clear why financial inflows have flown out quickly from the developing 
region despite greater financial openness. Of course, successive economic troubles in the 1990s 
and the 2000s due to financial openness have contributed to reduce incomes. 
 For the industrialized region, the gross income elasticities due to financial flows are posi-
tive, but small, throughout the period. Incorporating adjustments for net external position, the fig-
ures reveal a steady positive trend. The figures confirm the purported relationship between finan-
cial openness and incomes, at least for the industrialized region. 
 One possible explanation for the experience of the industrialized region concerns the na-
ture of financial flows, which have remained concentrated within the region. Financial structures 
there have already reached maturity that they can accommodate financial innovations to support 
economic activities. If unfavorable developments arose elsewhere, financial flows would simply 
consolidate or regroup into the industrialized region. When stability has been regained, financial 
flows then emerge to resume operations. Of course, finance has flowed to the developing regions, 
but these have on the whole been driven by a search for quick profits that can be drawn into the 
industrialized region to be deployed on the economic activities of the latter. Moreover, financial 
flows between the developing and industrialized regions generate adverse effects on incomes in 
the former so, in the end, finance is drawn back to the latter. There is little prospect for a change 
in this nature of flows.  
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 Another explanation involves the complementary nature of financial flows within the in-
dustrialized region. As noted above, financial flows have reinforced the reapplication of finance 
to support the enlargement of economic activities in the industrialized region. There are therefore 
secondary effects from financial flows to the region in the form of enhanced domestic linkages, 
which help sustain factors like technology advancement, greater productivity, and agglomeration 
economies. Despite the apparent small effects of financial flows, what is evident is that the indu-
strialized region has enjoyed direct and indirect benefits from financial openness. The sheer mo-
mentum effect of a large economy guarantees the continued rise of income in the region. 
 
 Domestic Economic Size and Income 
 In Africa, gross income elasticities due to domestic economic size have dramatically fal-
len over time. Adjusting for economic openness, the figures in Table 3 reveal that the domestic 
base still has some capacity to support economic activities but not large enough to suggest that it 
can pull the region up from economic stagnation. 7 Still, the figures indicate that the domestic 
base can help lessen the negative effects of economic openness on income. There is at least the 
possibility that if a revival of Africa’s domestic base occurs it support economic expansion. 
 Evidently, the small domestic base of Africa has translated into small effects on income. 
The region is unable to induce large domestic demand. Low income thus contributes to further 
dampen domestic demand. Poor human capital, complicated by a combination of domestic socio-
political factors, has contributed to aggravate an already depressed situation in the region, thus 
weakening further an already weak domestic base. What was left of the domestic base cannot re-
verse a stagnation spiral or overturn the negative effects of economic openness. Meanwhile, out-
migration has intensified the difficult situation in an emaciated region because those left behind 
do not have the capacity to generate economic activities. Such problems haunt Africa today and 
                                                 
7 10 units increase in domestic size implies 19 units increase in income (or 3.3 per cent of average income 
in the 2000s); at 15 units, 28.5 units increase in income (or 4.9 per cent of average income in the 2000s). 
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explain why the domestic base has a trivial role in the region. Of course, economic openness has 
contributed to smash up the domestic base.  
 Asian gross income elasticities due to the domestic size are the largest across regions. 
Even with adjustments for economic openness, the figures remain large to suggest that the do-
mestic base has an important role in the economic strength of the region.8 In short, these figures 
highlight how a robust domestic base cushions any adverse impact from economic openness.    
 At the least, the findings for Asia support the view that a large domestic base generates 
large income effects from economic activities supported by, say, scale economies and market 
size. More fundamentally, the domestic base has to have the capacity to transform a potential into 
actual changes in income. The decreasing trend, however, indicates some problems. Rapid popu-
lation expansion has produced some strains on the capacity of the domestic base. There is a re-
lated problem with the provision of infrastructure, which has lagged, if not remained stagnant, 
after the economic troubles of the 1990s. Robust economic activities limit the already stretched 
out infrastructure from supporting domestic base. Institutional and organizational systems have to 
be upgraded as well to create additional space for future expansions. And so, even if Asia enjoys 
over the medium term a momentum effect from the existing domestic base, the constraints have 
strengthened to break it up slowly. Of course, the reduction of the contribution of the domestic 
base has been subdued by out-migration, which has helped improve the productivity of resources. 
But it needs to be pointed out that openness has contributed to the deterioration of the domestic 
base. What is needed for the long-term is a reversal of a tightening domestic capacity through the 
expansion of infrastructure, improvement of institutions and organizations, improvements in hu-
man capital, etc. Meanwhile, the domestic base has enough capacity over the medium term to 
offset the negative effects of economic openness.  
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
                                                 
8 10 units increase in domestic size implies 71 units increase in income (or 6.2 per cent of average income 
in the 2000s); at 15 units, 106.5 units increase in income (or 9.2 per cent of average income in the 2000s). 
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 For the Americas, gross income elasticities due to the domestic base are found to be small 
in magnitude. They are smaller after adjustments for economic openness have been included.9 
The intriguing finding is that the Americas have smaller figures than Africa’s, suggesting that the 
domestic base does not drive economic activities in the region. 
 A small domestic base and subdued domestic demand in a region that is well-off relative 
to Africa and Asia suggest some serious internal problems. An issue that comes up immediately is 
the disparity in income distribution. The domestic base has lost its role as a source of domestic 
demand because of inequality, the impact of which is larger than anywhere among developing 
regions. Another issue concerns the limited shift from import-substitution-inspired strategies. 
Economic activities have contributed little because of the inadequate utilization as well as crea-
tion of opportunities because the domestic base cannot develop. Economic openness has also re-
stricted the domestic base from playing a more meaningful role in the region. Again, problems 
with infrastructure, institutional and organizational systems, and human capital, etc., enhance the 
constraints and weaken the domestic base. In the Americas, at least, the domestic base has not 
delivered sufficient stimulus for economic expansion.  
 The estimated domestic size elasticities of the industrialized region reveal a steady trend 
from the 1980s to the 2000s even after adjusting the figures for economic openness. Despite the 
small figures, they are still sufficient to show that the domestic base generates large increases in 
income. 
 The industrialized region has enjoyed a robust domestic base. It strength has been drawn 
from the solid infrastructural, institutional and organizational systems, and human capital base, 
etc., which have supported economic activities and economic openness. The synergy between 
external and internal forces has held economic expansion at a steady pace, so even a small stimu-
lus on the domestic base has translated into large effects on income. In the end, an already high 
                                                 
9 10 units increase in domestic size implies 11 units increase in income (or 0.4 per cent of average income 
in the 2000s); at 15 units, 16.5 units increase in income (or 0.6 per cent of average income in the 2000s). 
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level of income is enhanced with further expansions. The synergy has also supported the creation 
of new economic activities. But more importantly, the synergy has enabled the domestic base to 
accommodate changes in domestic demand and/or economic openness. Table 3 suggests that this 
scenario is not likely to change in the short- to medium-term as an advanced domestic base gene-
rating momentum effects. Diminishing returns, however, can easily occur. Thus stronger econom-
ic expansions would be possible in the region if there are discrete additions to infrastructure, insti-
tutional and organizational systems, and human capital, etc. What is evident in the industrialized 
region is that the domestic base has sustained economic expansion to complement economic 
openness.  
 
 Economic Openness and Domestic Economic Size 
 The next step is to put together overall trade and financial openness with domestic eco-
nomic size to see their net effect on income. Table 4 suggests that the developing regions have 
progressively been at the disadvantage with economic openness. Africa has not benefited from it 
since the 1990s. Figures for the Americas show that the region has not had positive experience 
with it since the 1980s. Not surprisingly, Asia has the best results, albeit the figures suggest a 
negative experience by the 1990s. The changes in their trends coincide with the dramatic opening 
of the developing regions as deregulation and liberalization became entrenched. This finding cor-
roborates the view that, in those junctures, openness became an end goal rather than a means to 
economic expansion. Despite the challenges with openness, the industrialized region basically has 
gained from it. Table 4 thus suggests that there is something amiss in the way in which external 
engagement has been pursued by the developing regions, if not how they have been made to pur-
sue it.  
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
 The overall economy picture can be obtained by putting together net openness and net 
domestic economic size. First, Table 4 illustrates how the domestic base can counterbalance some 
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of the adverse effects of openness. However, notice that Africa and the Americas have the same 
downward trend – although the former has a dramatic decline – suggesting that, on balance, there 
has been an erosion of income in these two regions. Their situations quickly worsen as the do-
mestic base deteriorates. As they pursue aggressive openness, therefore, there are smaller gains to 
be had. In contrast, the figures for Asia attest to the important role of the domestic base as a coun-
terbalancing force to openness. Even though there has been a decline in the strength of its domes-
tic base, the figures suggest that it continues to function relatively well. Thus economic expansion 
occurs in Asia despite of openness. Finally, the industrialized region has enjoyed an upward trend 
in the overall economy precisely because of a solid domestic base and gains from openness.  
 One conclusion from Table 4 is that, all other things constant, the developing regions 
have experienced reductions in their incomes with aggressive external engagement, while indu-
strialized region has been able to at least maintain its income. As such, income divergence occurs 
between the developing and industrialized regions despite convergence in economic openness. 
Second, the developing regions have not achieved economic progress through openness alone. In 
Asia, for instance, the domestic base plays an important role in pulling up income. However, 
elsewhere in the developing region, the domestic base has fallen back, and consequently it has 
played a relatively small role in economic expansion. And because the domestic base has wea-
kened or deteriorated, there have been problems in transforming openness into increases in in-
come. Even in Asia, where income convergence with the industrialized region is observed, has 
found it increasingly difficult to sustain its robustness because the domestic base has also been 
weakening. The conclusion is that openness does not make increases in income inevitable since 
economic progress is contingent on the nature of and the prevailing domestic conditions when 
external engagement is pursued. 
 
THE PHILIPPINE EXPERIENCE 
 The Philippines’ gross income elasticity due to trade openness is positive throughout the 
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1980s to the 2000s. Adjusting for trade balance, the figures suggest that the country has gained 
from trade openness, with moderate increases in magnitudes over time.10 These figures are com-
parable to the Asian region. Gross income elasticity due to financial openness is positive but has 
fallen steadily. After adjustments for net external position, the figures suggest that the country has 
also gained from financial openness, albeit the magnitudes are small.11 In short, there has been an 
encouraging experience with financial openness. But these figures contrast those for the Asian 
region. Lastly, gross income elasticities due to domestic economic size are positive, but after ad-
justments for gross openness, they reveal a progressively deteriorating domestic base.12 In short, 
the problem for the Philippines has been its weak domestic base. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 Table 6 combines trade and financial elasticities to see the net openness scenario, and the 
result is straightforward: the Philippines has had better experience with external engagement than 
the Asian region in general. The positive picture, however, is reversed when net openness is com-
bined with net domestic elasticities. The weakened domestic base overwhelms the gain from eco-
nomic openness, thus pushing the figures into the negative zone starting in the 1990s. Even in the 
1980s, the overall economy figures suggest little change in income. Consequently, there has been 
a progressive deterioration in income in the Philippines. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
  The Philippines has been aggressive with external engagement. Economic openness was 
pursued starting in the late 1970s, albeit in a stop-and-go manner because of the domestic eco-
                                                 
10 10 units increase in trade openness implies 35 units increase in income (or 3.4 per cent of average income 
in the 2000s); at 15 units, 52.5 units increase in come (or 5.2 per cent of average income in the 2000s).  
11 10 units increase in financial openness implies 11 units increase in income (or 1.1 per cent of average 
income in the 2000s); at 15 units, 16.5 units increase in income (or 1.6 per cent of average income in the 
2000s). 
12 10 units increase in domestic size implies 38 units decrease in income (or 3.7 per cent of average income 
in the 2000s); at 15 units, 57 units decrease in income (or 5.6 per cent of average income in the 2000s).   
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nomic problems in the 1970s and early 1980s. Significant opening really began in the late 1980s, 
and by the 1990s, openness was entrenched as a guiding principle in economic management.  
 As the country embraced economic openness, it however did not institute an industriali-
zation program fundamental to successful external engagement. Instead, non-interventionist posi-
tion towards economic management was instituted. Planning and programming became token 
procedures. Often, they lacked vision and direction. There was a profound faith in openness as the 
answer to the developmental problems in the country. In the process, the productive structure was 
allowed to deteriorate and, in due course, the weakened domestic base was blamed for the eco-
nomic doldrums. The weakest link of the economy to its economic progress was abandoned in the 
end in order not to aggravate the problems. 
 Meanwhile, changes were made on the domestic base even as the Philippines disengaged 
from it. One of these was a rapid reorganization of the economy, to shift the structure from indus-
trial and agriculture activities to services activities. There was also an assault on production that, 
by the 1990s, the productive base was disseminated. Take note that the reorganization of the do-
mestic base happened in a context of nascent industrialization. The emergence of service activi-
ties pushed the Philippines into premature, but permanent, deindustrialization. Rather than pull 
the domestic base up on the production ladder, the country was made to jump into openness as the 
easy way out to its underdevelopment even when the requisites for effective external engagement 
were absent. Naturally, the authorities considered the productive structure as detrimental to eco-
nomic progress and that it needed to be abolished; still, the withdrawal from the domestic base 
was not necessary. 
 Furthermore, the country embarked on aggressive deregulation and liberalization of the 
domestic base. As in other developing regions, financial openness meant more liabilities-
creating rather than asset-creating flows, which contributed to the demolition of the productive 
structure. Rules on financial flows were relaxed. The authorities in the end did not have control 
on what funds to allow and where to deploy them. Neither did they have control over outflows. 
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In the end, financial inflows flowed out in a revolving door fashion because the domestic base 
was unable to absorb the funds. Risks of default thus remained high throughout the 1980s to the 
2000s. Likewise, trade flows were relaxed. Initially, easing of import flows was used as a dis-
ciplining mechanism against entrenched interests in the domestic base. But, in time, it accele-
rated the demolition of the productive structure. Precisely because of these developments that 
economic openness resulted in the hollowing out of the domestic base. 
 Of course, in contrast to most developing countries, the Philippines benefited from eco-
nomic openness. Such a scenario is not surprising where the domestic base has been destroyed 
and openness has become the only course to sustain the residual economic activities. Unfortunate-
ly, the result would be fleeting and not have long-term consequences for structural transforma-
tion. 
 To some degree, economic mismanagement also contributed to the decimation of the 
domestic base in the Philippines. The persistent tightness of public finance has constrained the 
authorities from supporting the domestic base. Poor finances has meant that they enjoyed little 
autonomy in maneuvering resources. Efforts to boost economic activities have been quickly ex-
hausted. Of course, poor tax collection performance has been an important factor to the difficulty 
but so, too, the introduction of deregulation and liberalization. At the managerial level, public 
officials have remained the same people – often recycled from one post to another – whose basic 
understanding of structural transformation is contemptible. Indeed, most public officials blindly 
embrace external engagement and, with no second thoughts, dismiss domestic engagement. 
 Needless to say, population expansion has compounded the problem in the country. In-
come disparities has complicated the economic distress. People have been pushed to seek jobs 
elsewhere and mythologized by the authorities as heroes on whom the burden of economic 
progress has been obliged. The irony, of course, is that these people were pushed abroad because 
the domestic base has not produced economic opportunities.    
 The disintegration of the economy has reached a severe stage that it now requires a se-
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rious turnaround in attitudes toward positive domestic re-engagement. Since external engagement 
was executed by removing constraints on trade and financial flows, the re-introduction of regula-
tions is fundamental to change the current configuration. Of course, sound management of exter-
nal engagement is important. The domestic base needs to be rebuilt to avoid the progression of 
scale diseconomies and the entrenchment of economic stagnation. In the short-term, it is urgent to 
stop the further shrinkage of the productive structure and income. 
 A more serious problem in the Philippines is the singular focus of the authorities on eco-
nomic openness as a goal in itself. Indeed, it is the basic surrender to the external economy that 
has produced the economic malaise in the country. With no viable domestic base, the country is 
vulnerable to external shocks. With a weak domestic base, there is no countervailing force to the 
adverse effects of openness. External engagement is presented as the viable option for the country 
if it wants to achieve economic progress. No doubt, it is an easy route compared to salvaging the 
domestic base that would require genuine hard work to reverse years of neglect and assault. This 
rejection makes the authorities culpable for a betrayal of the economic interests of the country 
and the welfare of the people. Again, the problem for the Philippines is its weak domestic base 
despite wide-ranging openness. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 This paper retested the question: “does economic openness increase income?” And the 
short answer is: “It depends”. The cross-country results showed that, on balance, the developing 
regions had negative experiences with openness. In particular, Africa and the Americas did not 
gain from trade and financial openness. Asia, in contrast, benefited from trade openness but lost 
from financial openness. In the recent period, Asia has lost from openness. Based on these find-
ings, there is no support for the purported positive relationship between economic openness and 
income. However, there is a positive relationship in the industrialized region. The cross-country 
results also showed that domestic base played an important role in cushioning the impact of 
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openness, in turn supporting economic expansion. In the developing region, this role has wea-
kened over time. In the industrialized region, the domestic base has remained stable the whole 
time.  
 The results for the Philippines showed that economic openness has increasing benefits to 
the country. Sadly, its domestic base has notably deteriorated to an extent that it has become an 
economic concern. The country analysis stressed that the deterioration is a consequence of do-
mestic disengagement even as the Philippines embarked on aggressive external engagement. In a 
way, the country has resorted to external engagement to make up for the domestic weakness. 
Thus openness is offered as a solution to economic malaise even as it has also contributed to the 
demolition of the domestic base. If the domestic base is not rebuilt soon, there are serious risks 
that the Philippines would fall into scale diseconomies and economic stagnation because, even 
today, the gains from openness are not sufficient to offset the domestic hemorrhage. 
 There are valuable lessons from the findings of this paper. First, effective regulation of 
economic openness is very important to a successful external engagement. Trade and financial 
flows are also opportunities for extend economic activities but they need to support structural 
transformation, too. Government plays a crucial role in this context especially with regard to 
overall economic management to ensure that opportunities are available to trade and finance. It is 
vital that government has the capacity to withstand the demands for unregulated trade and finance 
and the ability to guide the economy towards a healthy expansion.  
 Second, economic openness requires more than opening up. Hard work is needed to build 
the capacity of the domestic base in order to be successful in transforming the economic possibili-
ties presented by openness into actual gains in terms of increased incomes. Hard work is also 
needed to construct the capability of government to discipline trade and finance as well as the 
domestic base. In short, a robust external engagement demands a corresponding robust domestic 
engagement. Regrettably, governments in the developing regions face threats against serious do-
mestic re-engagement. Of course, for some, external engagement is a necessary route because, 
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say, their economies are too small in size to be viable for scale economies and competition. Nev-
ertheless, that state of affairs is not a sufficient reason for serious domestic disengagement. Gov-
ernment needs to be careful not to abandon the domestic base. Domestic rigidities and distortions 
have to be addressed, for example, in order to ease the creation of domestic capacity and en-
hancement of external engagement. What the findings suggest is that those that have made the 
necessary adjustments in their domestic base have turned out to be also the ones who have suc-
ceeded the most with openness. In addition, successful external engagement provides a second-
stage thrust that reinforces the complementarity of domestic and external engagements. 
 Third, sustaining the domestic base is very important to benefit from external engage-
ment; more importantly, it is needed to support the structural transformation needed to maintain a 
positive experience with economic openness. In due course, solid domestic and external engage-
ments would result in a synergy that, while unique to a particular context, necessary for economic 
progress. Government has a crucial role in this context, especially in facilitating the process 
through broad participation and providing the environment conducive for its emergence.  
 Finally, a robust domestic base is indispensable to cushion the negative effects of eco-
nomic openness and to, in turn, support the formation of a synergy between domestic and external 
forces. Government needs to function well – not perfectly though it needs to learn to not repeat 
the same errors – because it needs to maintain some degree of effectiveness in steering the econ-
omy away from economic decay or stagnation. It is for this reason that Asia and the industrialized 
regions have been able to realize increases in their incomes despite openness, while the Philip-
pines (and others perhaps) has the reverse experience because of openness. 
 
LIST OF COUNTRIES 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameron, Canada, 
Chile, China PRC, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecua-
dor, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, 
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Honduras, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, 
Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, 
Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, Senegal, South 
Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela    
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Table 1: Income Elasticity due to Trade Openness 
 
Gross Flows Elasticity Income Mean Coefficient Elasticity 
Africa                       1980s 476.4 50.3 40.4 4.3 
                                  1990s 521.9 53.0 15.2 1.5 
                                  2000s 576.9 60.3 -5.3 -0.6 
     
Asia                          1980s 774.3 51.1 60.9 4.0 
                                  1990s 1,013.3 69.2 44.4 3.0 
                                  2000s 1,146.4 83.9 67.5 4.9 
     
Americas                  1980s 1,481.2 43.2 10.8 0.3 
                                  1990s 2,300.4 52.9 -13.3 -0.3 
                                  2000s 2,604.3 62.4 -25.4 -0.6 
     
Industrialized            1980s 12,205.4 60.4 -107.9 -0.5 
                                  1990s 22,502.3 63.5 -53.3 -0.2 
                                  2000s 27,053.7 76.1 -43.0 -0.1 
Net Flows Elasticity Income Mean Coefficient Elasticity 
Africa                       1980s 476.4 -8.2 57.3 -1.0 
                                  1990s 521.9 -9.3 109.5 -1.9 
                                  2000s 576.9 -8.5 242.0 -3.6 
     
Asia                          1980s 774.3 -4.8 185.8 -1.1 
                                  1990s 1,013.3 -2.4 125.1 -0.3 
                                  2000s 1,146.4 0.4 222.6 0.1 
     
Americas                  1980s 1,481.2 -2.5 101.4 -0.2 
                                  1990s 2,300.4 -4.9 146.2 -0.3 
                                  2000s 2,604.3 -5.1 118.6 -0.2 
     
Industrialized            1980s 12,205.4 -0.3 618.4 0.0 
                                  1990s 22,502.3 1.5 867.6 0.1 
                                  2000s 27,053.7 2.6 805.1 0.1 
Overall Flows Elasticity Income Mean Coefficient Elasticity 
Africa                       1980s    3.3 
                                  1990s    -0.4 
                                  2000s    -4.1 
     
Asia                          1980s    2.9 
                                  1990s    2.7 
                                  2000s    5.0 
     
Americas                  1980s    0.1 
                                  1990s    -0.6 
                                  2000s    -0.8 
     
Industrialized            1980s    -0.5 
                                  1990s    -0.1 
                                  2000s    0.0 
Note: Overall elasticity is gross minus net flows elasticities. Calculations of the author. 
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Table 2: Income Elasticity due to Financial Openness 
 
Gross Flows Elasticity Income Mean Coefficient Elasticity 
Africa                       1980s 476.4 91.1 25.6 4.9 
                                  1990s 521.9 135.5 7.9 2.1 
                                  2000s 576.9 134.5 -8.1 -1.9 
     
Asia                          1980s 774.3 63.4 10.0 0.8 
                                  1990s 1,013.3 92.0 -5.5 -0.5 
                                  2000s 1,146.4 108.5 -41.9 -4.0 
     
Americas                  1980s 1,481.2 102.9 11.7 0.8 
                                  1990s 2,300.4 117.9 2.4 0.1 
                                  2000s 2,604.3 125.3 -6.7 -0.3 
     
Industrialized            1980s 12,205.4 125.2 31.2 0.3 
                                  1990s 22,502.3 208.0 38.9 0.4 
                                  2000s 27,053.7 410.7 31.2 0.5 
Net Flows Elasticity Income Mean Coefficient Elasticity 
Africa                       1980s 476.4 -66.4 17.2 -2.4 
                                  1990s 521.9 -90.2 30.4 -5.3 
                                  2000s 576.9 -73.7 49.6 -6.3 
     
Asia                          1980s 774.3 -35.6 -24.0 1.1 
                                  1990s 1,013.3 -46.0 31.5 -1.4 
                                  2000s 1,146.4 -41.6 74.8 -2.7 
     
Americas                  1980s 1,481.2 -60.5 22.1 -0.9 
                                  1990s 2,300.4 -64.1 43.4 -1.2 
                                  2000s 2,604.3 -51.5 69.7 -1.4 
     
Industrialized            1980s 12,205.4 -12.1 131.5 -0.1 
                                  1990s 22,502.3 -11.3 114.2 -0.1 
                                  2000s 27,053.7 -10.0 88.4 0.0 
Overall Flows Elasticity Income Mean Coefficient Elasticity 
Africa                       1980s    2.5 
                                  1990s    -3.2 
                                  2000s    -8.2 
     
Asia                          1980s    1.9 
                                  1990s    -1.9 
                                  2000s    -6.7 
     
Americas                  1980s    -0.1 
                                  1990s    -1.1 
                                  2000s    -1.7 
     
Industrialized            1980s    0.2 
                                  1990s    0.3 
                                  2000s    0.4 
Note: Overall elasticity is gross minus net flows elasticities. Calculations of the author. 
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Table 3: Income Elasticity due to Domestic Economy 
 
Gross Flows Elasticity Income Mean Coefficient Elasticity 
Africa                       1980s 476.4 32.9 38.0 2.6 
                                  1990s 521.9 43.8 25.0 2.1 
                                  2000s 576.9 52.7 15.2 1.4 
     
Asia                          1980s 774.3 199.0 34.0 8.7 
                                  1990s 1,013.3 220.7 28.6 6.2 
                                  2000s 1,146.4 251.9 26.2 5.8 
     
Americas                  1980s 1,481.2 56.7 23.5 0.9 
                                  1990s 2,300.4 69.1 13.4 0.4 
                                  2000s 2,604.3 79.0 5.9 0.2 
     
Industrialized            1980s 12,205.4 124.5 13.5 0.1 
                                  1990s 22,502.3 144.3 27.4 0.2 
                                  2000s 27,053.7 149.4 23.4 0.1 
Net Flows Elasticity Income Mean Coefficient Elasticity 
Africa                       1980s 476.4 32.9 76.7 5.3 
                                  1990s 521.9 43.8 56.9 4.8 
                                  2000s 576.9 52.7 35.5 3.2 
     
Asia                          1980s 774.3 199.0 73.1 18.8 
                                  1990s 1,013.3 220.7 63.0 13.7 
                                  2000s 1,146.4 251.9 58.4 12.8 
     
Americas                  1980s 1,481.2 56.7 72.9 2.8 
                                  1990s 2,300.4 69.1 56.0 1.7 
                                  2000s 2,604.3 79.0 42.6 1.3 
     
Industrialized            1980s 12,205.4 124.5 37.4 0.4 
                                  1990s 22,502.3 144.3 58.1 0.4 
                                  2000s 27,053.7 149.4 60.0 0.3 
Overall Flows Elasticity Income Mean Coefficient Elasticity 
Africa                       1980s    2.7 
                                  1990s    2.7 
                                  2000s    1.9 
     
Asia                          1980s    10.0 
                                  1990s    7.5 
                                  2000s    7.1 
     
Americas                  1980s    1.9 
                                  1990s    1.3 
                                  2000s    1.1 
     
Industrialized            1980s    0.2 
                                  1990s    0.2 
                                  2000s    0.2 
Note: Overall elasticity is net minus gross flows elasticities. Calculations of the author. 
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Table 4: Overall Income Elasticity 
 
 Africa Asia Americas Industrialized 
  Overall Openness         1980s 2.9 2.4 0.0 -0.2 
                                        1990s -1.8 0.4 -0.9 0.1 
                                        2000s -6.2 -0.8 -1.3 0.2 
     
  Overall Domestic         1980s 2.7 10.0 1.9 0.2 
                                        1990s 2.7 7.5 1.3 0.2 
                                        2000s 1.9 7.1 1.1 0.2 
     
  Overall Economy         1980s 5.6 12.4 1.9 0.1 
                                        1990s 0.9 7.9 0.4 0.3 
                                        2000s -4.3 6.2 -0.2 0.4 
Note: Overall Openness is average of overall trade & financial openness (Tables 1 and 2). Overall 
Domestic is from Table 3. Overall Economy is sum of Overall Openness & Domestic. Calculations 
of the author. 
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Table 5: Income Elasticity due to Openness and Domestic Economy 
 
 Philippines 
Gross Flows Elasticity Income Mean Coefficient Elasticity 
  Trade Openness             1980s 641.8 47.6 29.9 2.2 
                                   1990s 941.1 82.3 24.3 2.1 
                                  2000s 1014.6 107.4 23.7 2.5 
     
  Financial Openness        1980s 641.8 96.4 8.0 1.2 
                                  1990s 941.1 112.7 7.1 0.9 
                                  2000s 1014.6 137.4 3.3 0.4 
     
  Domestic Economy       1980s 641.8 180.2 11.9 3.3 
                                 1990s 941.1 227.0 18.1 4.4 
                                 2000s 1014.6 263.9 19.1 5.0 
Net Flows Elasticity Income Mean Coefficient Elasticity 
  Trade Openness             1980s 641.8 -2.0 -71.8 0.2 
                                   1990s 941.1 -7.5 -50.6 0.4 
                                  2000s 1014.6 -9.9 -106.7 1.0 
     
  Financial Openness        1980s 641.8 -62.8 0.4 0.0 
                                  1990s 941.1 -57.1 -8.7 0.5 
                                  2000s 1014.6 -62.0 -11.0 0.7 
     
  Domestic Economy       1980s 641.8 180.2 6.7 1.9 
                                 1990s 941.1 227.0 8.7 2.1 
                                 2000s 1014.6 263.9 4.6 1.2 
Overall Flows Elasticity    Elasticity 
  Trade Openness             1980s    2.4 
                                   1990s    2.5 
                                  2000s    3.5 
     
  Financial Openness        1980s    1.2 
                                  1990s    1.4 
                                  2000s    1.1 
     
  Domestic Economy       1980s    -1.5 
                                 1990s    -2.3 
                                 2000s    -3.8 
Note: See Tables 1, 2 and 3. Calculations of the author. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Overall Income Elasticity 
 
 Philippines 
 Overall Openness                                    1980s 1.8 
                                                                 1990s 2.0 
                                                                 2000s 2.3 
  
 Overall Domestic                                    1980s -1.5 
                                                                 1990s -2.3 
                                                                 2000s -3.8 
  
 Overall Economy                                    1980s 0.3 
                                                                 1990s -0.3 
                                                                 2000s -1.4 
Note: See Table 5. Calculations of the author. 
 
